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1 Introduction
In January 2006, the university canteen for staff members of an Italian Economics Department
was serving overcooked pasta and oily tomato sauce. The canteen was run by a private contrac-
tor on a 5-year contract, expiring in December 2006. From November 2006, higher standards
were observed; the pasta being cooked al dente and some delicious sauces being served. There
were rumors that a new chef had been hired. In the following December the university decided
to renew the contract with the catering company, but the higher standards did not last: by the
end of January 2007, the quality of the food had gone back to its initial level.
Similar features have been observed in other sectors such as sports or public procurement. In
professional basketball, using data on individual performance (points scored, rebounds, assists,
etc.) covering the 1980s and 1990s, Stiroh (2007) found that performance improved significantly
in the year before signing a multi-year contract, and declined after the contract was signed.1 The
same pattern was noted in professional baseball.2 In the UK railway industry, using a panel
of the 25 franchisees providing passenger services in 1997-2000, Affuso and Newbery (2000)
found that contractors’ voluntary investment in rolling stocks increased — presumably leading
to better service — towards the end of the contracts. And in the French water industry, Chong,
Huet and Saussier (2006) found that contracts near expiry date had lower prices compared to
other contracts, all things being equal.3
In this paper, we first provide a rationale for such performance patterns;4 it is based on
information decay, due e.g. to random productivity shocks. For example, a catering company
using natural ingredients may benefit from a change in market attitude towards organic food; an
athlete may have an accident that affects his ability to play; a private contractor may experience
improved productivity thanks to technological change; and so on. Because of such information
1He also found that players were strongly rewarded for improvements in performance in their contract year:
a one-point increase in a player’s scoring average, for example, was associated with an annual salary increase of
over $300,000. Sen and Rice (2008) document a similar pattern, using performance and contract data from a
panel of NBA players from 1991 to 2006.
2Using a sample of free agent contracts signed in the US between 2000 and 2004, baseball analysts observed
that, with the exception of superstar players who had already established themselves as perennial caliber players,
hitting players’ performance was exceeding expectations in the last year of their contract and declining drastically
in the following three years. See http://baseballanalysts.com/archives/2006/03/longterm_free_a.php and also
http://expertvoices.nsdl.org/cornell-info204/2010/03/10/winners-curse-in-mlb-free-agency/
3While the study relies on a cross-section analysis of 1102 French local public authorities in 2001, their
finding suggests that operators raise the performance of their public-service provision, and thus the payoff of
the public authority, by reducing their prices as the expiry date of the contract approaches.
4The labour literature has provided ample empirical evidence and rationale as to why performance may be
higher (or absenteism may be lower) before tenure or promotion, but lower afterwards (see e.g. Lazear, (2004),
Ichino and Riphahn (2005)). Less attention, however, has been devoted to performance patterns within the
pre-promotion or pre-tenure period.
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decay, recent performance provides more information than past performance about the agent’s
(current) productivity. This in turn induces the agent to improve his performance when a new
contract is to be signed, e.g. by investing (hiring a new chef for a catering company, adopting
a better training technique for an athlete, investing in a new technology for a company, and
so on), or by exerting effort (spending more time in the kitchen for a chef, undertaking more
intense training for an athlete, hiring temporary staff for a company, and so on).
To capture this insight in a simple way, we consider in Section 2 a baseline model in which
an agent provides a good or service for two periods, followed by competition for the agent’s
services in the next period. In each period, the agent’s performance is observable but nonver-
ifiable and depends on his unobservable innate productivity (the agent’s “type”). Over time,
this productivity may change exogenously (through random shock), or endogenously through
nonverifiable investment.
In this setting, the agent cannot be explicitly incentivized to invest, as performance and
investment are nonverifiable, but career concerns create an implicit incentive, as by providing
a good performance the agent enhances his future market value. Indeed, in the last period
of the contract the agent invests if needed when information is sufficiently persistent (so that
current performance provides a good enough signal of future productivity and performance),
the future matters (that is, the agent’s discount factor is high enough) and the investment
brings great value for its cost. By contrast, the agent never invests in the first period of the
contract. This is due to information decay (as earlier past performance is less informative about
future productivity and performance), discounting (as the agent would rather incur the cost of
investment later than sooner), as well as crowding out : the agent has less incentives to invest if
investment occurs anyway in the following period. As a result, expected performance improves
towards the end of the contract.
We show that these insights apply as well when the agent interacts with a single buyer, as it
is often the case in public procurement.5 We consider as well the case where the agent can also
exert effort to improve current performance. In the second period, the agent then favours effort
over investment whenever the former is cheaper; this, in turn, creates incentives to invest in the
first period, although expected performance still weakly improves over time. Thus, for products
or services with large potential for performance improvement, such as catering services, public
services, consultancy, or sports, both long-term investment and short-term effort can take place
5This links our paper to the repeat-purchase mechanism for experience goods pioneered by Klein and Leffler
(1981). The incentives generated by contract renewal were initially investigated by Taylor and Wiggings (1997).
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— the former at the beginning of a contract and the latter towards the end.
To derive the implications for optimal contract duration, we consider an infinite repetition
of the model. Increasing the duration of the contracts has then two opposite effects on perfor-
mance. On the one hand, it reduces the frequency of investment, because as before the agent
only invests in the last period of a contract. On the other hand, it increases the intensity of the
investment in these last periods: there is less crowding out, as future investment is further away.
The optimal contract duration depends on the relative importance of these two effects: for ex-
ample, longer contracts are desirable when it is important to foster the intensity of investment
in the last contracting periods, which is the case when investment is costly, information decay
is high, or the weight given to the future (as measured by the discount factor) is low. Thus,
contrary to common wisdom, long-term contracting is optimal when there is a need for greater
implicit incentives, whereas short-term contracting is optimal when noncontractible investment
has persistent, long term effects.
Our paper incorporates information decay in a multi-period contract with career concerns.
In Holmström (1982), the agent exerts effort to increase performance, in an attempt to influence
market beliefs about his type. However, whilst this literature also explores information decay
due to switching types,6 the focus has been on stationary environments.7 We focus instead
on performance patterns over the life of the contracts.8 In addition, by allowing for endoge-
nous type-switching, we are able to study the choice between such (long-term) productivity
investment and (short-term) performance improvement effort, as well as their interaction over
time. Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2010) also introduce endogenous switching types in a career
concerns settings, but their focus is on the value of reputation under different market learning
hypotheses, rather than on performance patterns.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on the effects of contract duration, or the
frequency of evaluations, on incentives.9 On the one hand, longer contracts alleviate moral
hazard problems by facilitating consumption smoothing (Lambert (1983)) and ease hold-up
6See for example Mailath and Samuelson (2001) and Phelan (2006). As discussed in depth by Bar-Isaac and
Tadelis (2008), for reputational concerns to be sustained over time, the market must never fully learn the type
of the agent. This may hold for example if types exogenously change over time or if there is finite memory.
7Hidden action models of relational contracting have also focused on stationary environments rather than
on performance dynamics; see MacLeod (2007) for a survey.
8Information decay and career concerns have been used to explain performance dynamics in other contexts
— e.g., earnings smoothing in Fudenberg and Tirole (1995); pre-election policies in Cukiermann and Meltzer
(1986) and Martinez (2009); and political budget cycle in Rogoff (1990).
9A link also exists with the literature in repeated games with imperfect monitoring that looks at the effect of
frequency of interaction (or the effect of shortening the period length) on incentives; see e.g. Abreu, Milgrom,
and Pearce (1991).
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and ratchet effects in the presence of specific investment (Laffont and Tirole (1993)). On the
other hand, shorter contracts increase the flexibility to use new information as it comes along
(Ellman (2006)) and reduce the gain from defection from implicit agreements (Shapiro (1983),
Strausz (2009) and Calzolari and Spagnolo (2009)), making them optimal when the agent’s
hidden actions do not generate persistent effects.10 This literature has mostly focused on moral
hazard issues. By allowing also for heterogeneous productivity types and information decay, we
obtain quite different implications.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline model where there
is competition for the service of an agent. The agent can invest to enhance his productivity; we
mainly focus on constant returns to scale, but also discuss the case of decreasing returns to scale,
as well as the case of a principal-agent relationship. Section 3 studies optimal contract duration
in an infinitely repeated version of the baseline model with investment only. Section 4 extends
the baseline model to the case where the agent can choose between effort and investment.
Section 5 concludes and provides some testable predictions. Some proofs are relegated in the
Appendix, and the more technical developments as well as some extensions are provided in an
online Appendix.
2 Baseline model
We first focus here on the dynamics of incentives provided by career concerns, when the agent’s
productivity can evolve both exogenously (random shocks) and endogenously (investment). We
consider a baseline model in which an agent provides a good or service for two periods ( = 1 2),
followed by competition for the agent’s services in the next period ( = 3). As in Holmström
(1982):
• the agent’s “performance” (e.g., output, quality, and so forth) is observable but nonveri-
fiable; it depends on the agent’s innate productivity (his “type”), which for technological
reasons may exogenously change over time;
• at the end of the two periods, the agent’s payoff depends on market beliefs about his
productivity.
10Evidence on the determinants of contract duration shows that contracts are longer when relationship-
specific investment is important (Joskow (1987)) and shorter in periods of higher uncertainty (Masten and
Crocker (1985) and Saussier (1999)), which is consistent with the benefit of shorter contracts in the presence
of information decay. The findings of Bandiera (2007) are also consistent with the idea that contract length is
chosen to provide incentives.
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We depart from Holmström’s model, however, by allowing the agent to make a nonverifiable
(and possibly unobservable) investment to enhance his productivity.
2.1 Framework
Productivity and performance. In each period , the agent’s performance  can take two values:
high () or low (). The realized performance depends on: (i) the agent’s productivity type,
, which can also take two values, high () or low (), and (ii) investment, which costs  to
the agent; we denote by  ∈ [0 1], the probability that the agent actually invests in period
. We assume that the initial productivity of the agent, 1, is randomly drawn and equally
likely to be  or ; absent investment, the productivity  evolves over time according to a
Markov process, with transition probability  ≥ 12. We further assume that current type and
investment affect current performance and future types in a similar way:
• if  =  or  = 1, then
 =  and +1 =
½  with probability 
 with probability 1−  ;
• if instead  =  and  = 0, then
 =  and +1 =
½  with probability 
 with probability 1−  
An interpretation of this process is that the agent can invest to improve his productivity,
which enhances both current performance and the distribution of his productivity in the next
period. It follows that current performance constitutes a “sufficient statistic” for the agent’s
future productivity and performance. The parameter  reflects information decay: a lower
value of  denotes faster changing technologies and therefore a lower probability that, absent
any investment, the agent’s productivity in period + 1 remains the same as in period .
Payoff. As productivity and performance are nonverifiable, they do not affect the agent’s
payoff; this payoff thus depends only on the agent’s market value in period 3, which increases
with his expected performance in that period, 3 ≡  [3 | 1 2]. For the sake of exposition, we
will simply assume that the agent appropriates 3 — later on, the agent’s market value will also
depend on exogenous variables such as the parties’ discount factor and endogenous variables
such as the expected investment in future periods. Denoting by  the discount factor of the
agent, his objective is thus:
Π =
=3X
=1
−1 = −1 − 2 + 23
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Timing. The timing of the game is as follows. Periods  = 1 and  = 2: (i)  is realized and
observed by the agent; (ii) the agent chooses whether to invest; (iii)  is realized and publicly
observed.11 Then in period  = 3, the agent obtains 3.
2.2 Performance dynamics
As performance and investment are nonverifiable, the agent cannot be explicitly incentivized to
provide high performance. However, career concerns create an implicit incentive, as past per-
formance affects the market value of the agent in period 3. In our setting, only the performance
in the last period of the contract actually matters. Let ∆ ≡  − ; we have:
Proposition 1 The payoff of the agent in period 3 increases with his performance in the pre-
vious period, 2: 3 = 3 (2), given by
3 (2) =  [3 | 2] =
½ + ∆ if 2 = 
+ (1− )∆ if 2 =  (1)
Proof. This follows directly from the fact that: (i) 2 provides a sufficient statistic for 3, the
agent’s productivity at  = 3; and (ii) period 3 being the last period, the agent never invests in
that period.
In period 2 a low-type agent (2 = ) thus chooses 2 so as to maximize:
Π2 = −2 +  {+ [2+ (1− 2) (1− )]∆} =  [+ (1− )∆] + (2 − ) 2
where
2 ≡ (2− 1) ∆ (2)
The optimal investment is thus ∗2 = 1 if   2, and ∗2 = 0 if   2.
The expected payoff of a high-type agent (2 = ) is instead equal to Π2 =  (+ ∆).
Therefore, in period 1 a low-type agent (1 = ) will choose 1 so as to maximize:
Π1 = −1 + 
©1 £Π2 + (1− )Π2 ¤+ (1− 1) £(1− )Π2 + Π2 ¤ª
= (1− )Π2 + Π2 + (1 − ) 1
where the marginal benefit is now
1 ≡ (2− 1)  ¡Π2 −Π2 ¢ = (2− 1)  [2 − (2 − ) ∗2]  (3)
11The analysis does not depend here on whether the principal observes the productivity  and/or the in-
vestment decision : observing the performance  eliminates any relevant information asymmetry. In later
sections, in which the agent may temporarily increase performance, observing only that performance maintains
some ambiguity.
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Thus, in each period  = 1 2, the agent chooses his investment  so as to maximize ( − ) ;
the marginal benefit  is however lower in period 1 (that is, 1  2), for two reasons:
• information decay (  1) and discounting (  1) reduce the direct return from invest-
ment, as reflected by the additional factor (2− 1)  in (3);
• in addition, there is crowding out of investments across periods: the investment expected
in period 2, ∗2, reduces the incentives to invest in period 1 (as 2 ≥  when ∗2  0).
This leads to:
Proposition 2 The agent never invests in period 1, and he invests in period 2 if and only if
he has a low type and the cost is sufficiently low:
∗ = 1 if and only if  = 2, 2 = , and  ≤ ∗,
where ∗ ≡ (2− 1) ∆  0. The incentive to invest in period 2 therefore increases with the
degree of information persistence , the discount factor , and the performance differential ∆
relative to the cost .
Proof. From the above analysis, in period 2 the agent invests if   ∗ = 2, and does not
invest if   ∗ (in the limit case where  = ∗, the agent is indifferent between investing or not);
the comparative statics follow directly. We now show that the agent never invests in period 1.
When   ∗, the agent invests in period 2 whenever 2 = ; thus, investing in period 1 would
have no impact on 2 (and thus on 3), and although this would reduce the probability of having
to invest in period 2, the expected benefit from cost saving is only 1 = (2− 1)   . Instead,
when   ∗, the agent prefers not to invest in period 2; but then, it does not pay to invest
in period 1 either, as the benefit is even lower (due to information decay) and it comes later —
that is, we then have 1 = (2− 1)2 2∆ = (2− 1) ∗  .
The impact of information decay, discounting and crowding out is here extreme and actually
nullifies investment incentives in period 1: performance in that period has no impact on market
beliefs, as period 2 performance provides a sufficient statistic for the agent’s productivity in
period 3.12
Note that information decay affects not only the temporal pattern of the implicit incentive,
but also its strength. In case of full decay ( = 12), past performance tells nothing about
12In this baseline model, information decay (  1) is not necessary to generate the investment pattern:
discounting and crowding out suffice here. As we will see, this is no longer the case when the interaction is
repeated over time.
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future productivity; it thus has no impact on market beliefs, and the agent then never invests.
As  increases, past performance becomes more informative about the agent’s future produc-
tivity, which in turn gives the agent greater incentives. Investment incentives remain however
suboptimal: although the agent fully internalizes here the impact of his investment on his per-
formance in period 3, he ignores the short-term impact on the performance in periods 1 and
2 — this is particularly clear in period 1, where the agent never invests, but applies as well to
period 2.
An implication of Proposition 2 is that, on average, the agent’s performance improves as
the market evaluation approaches: the expected performance in period 1 is equally likely to
be  or , as the agent never invests in that period; in the second period, the performance is
instead equal to  with probability 1 when   ∗. Therefore:
Corollary 1 The expected performance (weakly) increases as the market evaluation approaches:
1 ≤ 2, with a strict inequality when   ∗.
Proof. See Appendix A.
2.3 Discussion
Before concluding this section, we briefly comment on the assumptions of this baseline model.
That performance and productivity levels are all binary simplifies the exposition but does
not play a critical role. The assumption that the agent knows his type is also not necessary
to generate the investment and performance patterns that we have described. If  were not
observed by the agent either, we would still observe investment only in period 2, as performance
in that period would still provide a sufficient statistic for predicting performance in period 3.13
Likewise, whilst the “sufficient statistic” feature greatly simplifies the analysis, we would expect
similar increasing investment and performance patterns with alternative processes determining
current productivity as a function of performance history, such as moving averages or other
higher-order Markov process, as long as recent performance provides more reliable information
about future productivity.
Our baseline model keeps in line with standard career concern models, in that competition
for the agent’s services in period 3 enables the agent to appropriate the expected value of his
13We provide a formal analysis of such a variant of our baseline model in Online Appendix A. Interestingly,
in this alternative baseline model, the incentive to invest increases over time even in the absence of information
decay or of discounting, as there is an additional “option value” in waiting and learning about the agent’s type
before deciding whether to invest.
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investment for that period. This setup is relevant for situations (e.g., the market for managers)
in which several “buyers” (the firms) compete for the same agent (the manager). However, our
analysis carries over to contexts (e.g., public procurement for refuse collection, water distribu-
tion, prison services, and so forth) where the agent (a private contractor) provides specialized
services that have mainly one buyer (the public authority), as long as the agent obtains some
benefit from enhancing the principal’s beliefs about his expected performance. We illustrate
this in Appendix B, using a simple model based on information rents: the agent invests to
make the principal more eager to contract; as a result, investment and performance exhibit the
same patterns as in our baseline model.
In a previous version of this paper (Iossa and Rey (2010)), we also considered investment
aiming at reducing cost rather than improving performance. Investment incentives then de-
crease, rather than increase, as the renewal date approaches, and this for two reasons. First,
the agent benefits more directly from cost reductions than from performance improvements.
Second, good performance may signal that the agent faces low cost, giving an incentive to the
principal to lower the price.14
Our baseline model also assumes for simplicity that investment is only valuable in case
of low productivity; more generally, investment could be socially desirable for both types of
agents, and both types could have an incentive to invest. For example, consider a variant where
the probability of a high performance is additively separable in past productivity and current
investment (e.g., it is of the form  + , with   0). Enhancing their market value
then gives both types of agents the same investment incentive;15 however, current performance
still provides a sufficient statistic for future productivity, and thus these investment incentives
remain concentrated in period 2.
In the same vein, the binary investment decision introduces “constant returns to scale”,
which exacerbates the investment dynamics. Yet, although decreasing returns to scale create a
motive for investment smoothing, the pattern remains “backloaded”.16 To see this, we briefly
consider the case where investment costs  () are convex (00 ≥ 0) and satisfy the boundary
conditions { (0) = 0 0 (0)  (2− 1) ∆}, as well as the particular case of isoelastic costs,
14This is also related to the ratchet effect identified in regulatory settings — see e.g. Pint (1992) and Laffont
and Tirole (1993); Lewis (1986) stresses that the threat of cancellation may also induce the contractor to make
nonverifiable cost-reducing investment in the early periods of a contract.
15Introducing cost or benefit complementarities between productivity and investment could even generate
greater incentives for a high productivity agent.
16The same holds when investment returns are stochastic, in which case the agent may invest in period 1, as
period 2 investment no longer guarantees high performance in the future.
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where  () =  for some   1 (in the baseline model,  = 1):
Proposition 3 In case of decreasing returns to scale, a low-type agent may invest in both
periods, but still invests more in period 2 than in period 1: 0 ≤ ∗1  ∗2 ≤ 1; hence the expected
performance still increases as the market evaluation approaches: 1  2. Furthermore, for
isoelastic costs the ratio ∗2∗1 increases with the value of investment (i.e., when ∆ increases),
information decay (i.e., when  decreases) and discounting (i.e., when  decreases).
Proof. See Appendix C.
As in the baseline model, in each period  a low-type agent chooses  so as to maximize
− (), where the investment benefits 1 and 2 are respectively given by (3) and (2). When
 () is convex, these optimization problems have unique solutions, which are both positive
when  (0) = 0 (0) = 0: due to decreasing returns, it is worth investing also in period 1, in
order to smooth investment cost over the lifetime of the contract. These investment benefits are
moreover lower in the first period (1  2), due to information decay, discounting and crowding
out; hence the agent still invests less in period 1 than in period 2 (∗1  ∗2), and all the more so
as  or  decreases, or ∆ increases.
3 Optimal contract duration
In this section we extend the analysis to study the impact of contract duration on incentives
and performance dynamics. For this purpose we plug the baseline model of Section 2 into
an infinitely repeated framework; that is, in each period  = 1 2 : if the agent is already
productive ( = ) or invests ( = 1), then current performance is high ( = ) and, in the
next period, the productivity is high (+1 = ) with probability ; otherwise, the current per-
formance is low ( = ) and, in the next period, the productivity is high only with probability
1− .
Suppose that the agent renegotiates the terms of his contract every  periods. At the
beginning of each contracting period  = 1 +1 2+1 , competition for the agent’s services
then allows him to appropriate the full expected value generated by the contract, of the form:
 (q−1) = 
" =X
=1
−1+−1 | q−1
#

where q−1 = {1  −1} denotes the agent’s performance history at the beginning of period
 .
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We will focus on Markov perfect equilibria, in which the agent’s investment strategy, and
thus the market expectations, are stationary. Consider a contract running from  = 1 to  = ,
following a performance  ∈ {} in the last period of the previous contract. As in the baseline
model, the most recent performance provides a sufficient statistic for the entire performance
history, and thus the agent never invests before the last period of a contract: 1 =  = −1 = 0;
in the last period, the agent may however invest in case of low productivity (i.e.,   0) if
it has a sufficient impact on the next market evaluation. The following Lemma describes the
corresponding productivity and performance pattern:
Lemma 1 The agent never invests before the last period of a contract. The probability  of a
high productivity in period  ( = ), as a function of the performance  ∈ {} observed in
the last period of the previous contract, is then given by:
 ≡ 1 + (2− 1)

2
  ≡ 1−  
The probability of a high performance in period  ∈ {1  − 1} is  =  ; in the last period
( = ), this probability becomes  =  + (1− ) .
Proof. See Appendix D.
The value  generated by the contract is therefore given by:
 =
X
=1
−1 (+ ∆) (4)
Hence, the agent’s overall expected payoff, evaluated at the beginning of the contract, can be
expressed as, for  ∈ {}:
Π =  − −1 (1− )  + 
£Π + (1− )Π¤  (5)
This equation determines recursive conditions that determine Π and Π, which we can use
to analyze the agent’s incentives to invest in the last period of the contract. When facing a low
productivity in period , the agent will then make his investment decision so as to maximize
( − ) , where
 ≡  ¡Π −Π¢ 
Using (5), in equilibrium the expected benefit  can be written as:
 = 
 −  + −1 ¡ − ¢ 
1−  ( − )  (6)
where  corresponds here to the equilibrium investment level in the last periods of future
contracts. Good performance in period  =  brings three types of benefit to the agent:
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• It increases the expected performance of the next contract by
 ¡ − ¢ = X
=1
 ¡ −  ¢∆ = X
=1
(2− 1) ∆−  (2− 1) ∆
As before, this benefit increases with the performance differential ∆ but suffers from
information decay (it decreases as  decreases), discounting (it decreases as  decreases)
and crowding out (reflected in the last term).
• It saves on the cost of future investment, , as it reduces the probability of having to
invest in the last period of the next contract by:¡ − ¢  = (2− 1) 
This benefit also decreases with information decay and discounting.
• It raises the probability of enjoying Π rather than Π in the following market evaluation
by:
 ¡ − ¢ = (2− 1)  (1− ) 
• This benefit, too, decreases with information decay and discounting, and suffers as well
from crowding out.
Building on this analysis, there exists a unique equilibrium, characterized as follows :
Proposition 4 Under −period contracting, there is a unique Markov perfect equilibrium; in
this equilibrium, the agent never invests during the first − 1 periods of a contract, and in the
th period:
• If  ≥ ¯ ≡ (2−1)∆
1−(2−1) , the agent never invests (∗ = 0);
• If  ≤  ≡ 1−(2−1)−1−11−(2−1) ¯, the agent invests with probability 1 in case of low productivity
(∗ = 1);
• If     ¯, the agent invests with probability ∗ = ˆ ∈ (0 1) in case of low productivity,
where
ˆ = 1− (2− 1)
 
(2− 1) 
µ
(2− 1) 
1− (2− 1)  −

∆
¶
 (7)
This equilibrium level of investment ∗ increases with the contract duration , the degree
of information persistence , the discount factor  and the relative performance benefit
∆.
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Proof. Due to crowding out, the expected benefit  =  () decreases as  increases.
Therefore, in equilibrium ∗ = 0 if   ¯ =  (0), ∗ = 1 if    =  (1), and if  ∈
( (1)   (0)) then ∗ = ˆ, such that  (ˆ) = , which leads to (7). From (7), the comparative
statics of ˆ with respect to  and ∆ are straightforward. For those with respect to  and ,
it suffices to note that  can be expressed as:
 () =
−1X
=1
(2− 1) ∆+ (2− 1)  [(1− )∆+ ]
1− (2− 1)  (1− ) 
which clearly increases with  and , but decreases with ; to see this, note that the sign of
 is the same as (using  ≡ (2− 1) ):
− [1−  (1− )] (∆− )− 
(−1X
=1
∆+  [∆− (∆− ) ]
)
= −1− 

1−  [∆− (1− ) ]
which is negative for  ≤ ¯.
In equilibrium, the agent invests when the performance differential ∆ is large enough, com-
pared to the investment cost , as well as when there is not too much information decay (that
is,  is high enough) or discounting ( high enough). To interpret the bound ¯, note that for
low investment levels: (i) there is little crowding out; and (ii) the benefit of saving on future
investment costs is also low. Therefore, the agent invests with positive probability whenever
the cost of doing so is lower than its “full” impact on future performance:
  
∞X
=1
(−1) ¡ − ¢¯¯¯¯¯
∗=0
=
∞X
=1
 (2− 1)∆ = ¯
Obviously, the threshold ¯ increases with ,  and∆, and thus it is natural to expect investment
to increase as well with these parameters. Increasing the investment levels however generates
crowding out, which tends to reduce the impact of current investment on future performance.
Crowding out is maximal for one-period contracting, where the agent never invests with prob-
ability 1 ( = 0). For longer contracts, however crowding out never completely eliminates the
benefit of investment: even if the agent invests with probability 1 at the end of the next con-
tract, investing today still has a positive effect on expected performance during the first − 1
periods of the next contract (but only that one); in addition, investing today now also allows
the agent to save on future investment costs. As a result, even if the agent always invests in
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case of low productivity at the end of the next contracts, it is still worth investing if ,  and
∆ are large enough, namely, if:
   ¡ − ¢¯¯∗=1 + (2− 1) 
⇔   
¡ − ¢¯¯∗=1
1− (2− 1)  =
−1X
=1
(2− 1) ∆
1− (2− 1)  = 
where   0 for   1. Finally, extending the length of the contracts limits crowding out — as
future investment comes later and less often; as a result, ∗ increases with the contract duration
.
We now study the implications for optimal contract duration. As competition for the agent’s
services allows him to appropriate all the surplus, in equilibrium the expected welfare coincides
with the agent’s ex ante expected payoff:
 = Π
 +Π
2

whereΠ denotes the equilibrium expected payoff at the beginning of a contract under −period
contracting, given the performance  ∈ {} in the last period of the previous contract. Using
(5), we have:
 =  − −1
∗
2
+ 
∙
 + 
∗
2
¡Π −Π¢¸
=

1−  +
−1
1− 
∗
2
£ ¡Π −Π¢− ¤  (8)
where  =  +2 denotes the equilibrium expected performance generated by the first contract
under −period contracting.
When investment is too costly ( ≥ ¯), the agent never invests: ∗ = 0 for any  ≥ 1. The
expected welfare is then equal to
 = 1
1− 
+
2

whatever the duration of the contracts. In what follows, we thus focus on the case where   ¯.
When instead contracts are sufficiently long that ∗ = 1, the expected welfare decreases as
the contract length  further increases, which then only delays the next periods of investment.
As the agent never invests in the early periods of a contract, and moreover fails to internalize
the impact of investment on current performance even in the last period, there is always un-
derinvestment. It is thus never optimal to choose a duration  larger than what is needed to
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induce ∗ = 1, as this would only make the investment less frequent, without any off-setting
effect on the investment intensity in the last periods of the contracts.
For shorter durations where ∗ = ˆ  1, the second term in (8) is nil;17 in that case, the
equilibrium expected welfare coincides with the ex ante expected performance generated by the
first contract, which from (4) is given by:
 = 
1−  =
X
=1
−1+
2
+ −1 ˆ
2
∆
1−  =
1
1− 
+
2
+
−1
1−  ˆ
∆
2
 (9)
Increasing the contract duration  has then two opposite effects on expected welfare:
• it increases investment intensity in the last period of a contract: ˆ increases with ;
• but it reduces the frequency of investment: −1 (1− ) decreases as  increases.
The following proposition shows that the intensity effect dominates here: it is always optimal
to increase  so as to increase ˆ despite the reduced frequency of its occurrence. It is therefore
optimal to make contracts just long enough to induce ∗ = 1. As this is more difficult to
achieve when investment is costly or not too valuable, or when there is substantial information
decay and discounting, the optimal contract duration increases with the relative cost ∆ and
decreases as  or  increases.
We show in the Appendix that a similar pattern arises for expected performance, leading to:
Proposition 5 When  ≥ ¯, the agent never invests; the duration of the contracts thus has no
impact on performance or welfare. When instead   ¯, expected welfare and performance are
both maximized by making the contracts just long enough to yield ∗ = 1. As an increase in the
discount factor () and/or persistence () encourages investment, whereas an increase in the
relative cost ∆ discourages it, the optimal duration ˆ ((2− 1) ∆) decreases as the discount
factor , the relative benefit ∆, and the degree  of information persistence increase.
Proof. See Appendix E.
The above “corner solution” (∗ = 1) is partly driven by the assumption of constant returns
to scale. As we have seen, with decreasing returns to scale (i.e., convex investments costs), the
agent may choose to limit his investment, and has moreover an incentive to smooth it over
the duration of the contract; yet, he still has more incentives to invest in later periods than
17This is obvious if ∗ = 0; if ∗ = ˆ ∈ (0 1), the agent is indifferent between investing or not in the last
period of a contract, and thus  ¡Π −Π¢ = .
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in previous ones, and longer contracts still foster investment incentives in the last periods of
a contract.18 In addition, even with convex costs, we would expect more weight being put on
frequency when investment levels are likely to be substantial even with short-term contracts,
that is, when the investment is valuable (∆ high), marginal costs are low, and there is little
information decay or discounting ( and  close to 1); in such a case, we would thus expect
short-term contracts to be optimal. When instead the relative costs are high, or there is a lot
of information decay or discounting, then longer contracts will become desirable, in order to
foster the agent’s incentive to invest in the last periods of these contracts.19
Note that longer contracts may generate greater implicit incentives is opposite to what
current wisdom suggests. The key here is that, as the agent never invests in the first periods of
a contract, increasing the length of the contracts attenuates the crowding out effect of future
investment, which in turn fosters the incentives to invest in the last period of a contract.
That short-term contracting is optimal when information persistence is high is also coun-
terintuitive. When  is high, investments have long-term effects, and one may have expected
long-term contracts to be optimal. This would for example be the case if the agent benefitted
from the investment during the execution of the contract (e.g., investment reduces operating
costs); he would then invest at the beginning of the contracts, and even more so if the contracts
get longer. Here, however, the agent invests only in the last periods of the contracts, to enhance
his market value for the next contracts; as information persistence makes it easier to induce
the agent to invest in these last periods, it becomes more important to increase their frequency,
through shorter contracts.
4 Extension: Signal jamming
This section extends our baseline model by allowing also for temporary performance improve-
ments. That is, in each period  = 1 2, a low-type agent ( = ) can choose between investing
as before in lasting improvements, or exerting effort to generate short-term effects:20 exerting
effort costs    but only improves current performance ( = ), and does not affect the dis-
18For instance, with two-period contracting the agent has more incentives to invest in the second period of
a contract than in the first one, and has also more incentives to invest in that period than under one-period
contracting. See Online Appendix F.
19See Online Appendix F for illustrations.
20For example, the catering company running the university canteen may increase the quality of the food
served in a given period by asking its chef to spend more time in the kitchen in that period (effort). Alternatively,
the company could hire a new chef (investment) bringing long-term quality improvements. Effort may also only
affect perceived performance — for example, athletes may use more Performance Enhancing Drugs (PEDs); we
thank Andy Skrzypacz for pointing this out to us.
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tribution of the agent’s type in the next period (that is, +1 coincides with  with probability
, regardless of the agent’s effort).21
Obviously, the agent will never invest or exert effort in period 3 (as this is the last period),
and in the previous periods he will never do so either when having a high productivity ( = ).
Consider now the behavior of a low productivity agent in period 2 (2 = ). The agent will
never invest in that period, as exerting effort would have the same impact on the market belief
and would be less costly to produce. He may however exert effort in order to enhance market
beliefs:
• If 2 = , the market infers that the agent has a low productivity in period 2, and thus
expects in period 3 a performance
 [3 | 1 2 = ] = + (1− )∆
• By contrast, 2 =  entertains ambiguity, since a high performance can be the result of
productivity or effort. Let 1 denote the market belief, as a function of the performance
1 ∈ {} observed in period 1, that the agent has a high productivity in period 2 when
observing 2 = . The expected performance in period 3, is then given by:
 [3 | 1 2 = ] = 1 ( + (1− )) + (1− 1) ((1− ) + )
= + (1− )∆+ (2− 1) 1∆
The expected payoff of a low-type agent, as a function of his past performance 1 and of his
current effort 2, is therefore:
Π2 (2; 1) =  [+ (1− )∆] + ((2− 1) 1∆− ) 2
As a result, in period 2, effort will be undertaken if:
  (2− 1) 1∆ (10)
Intuitively, the market will be more optimistic if it observes a high performance in period 1
( ≥ ); it follows that the agent has more incentive to exert effort in that case: denoting by
1 the equilibrium probability of effort in period 2, as a function of the performance 1 ∈ {}
observed in period 1, we expect  ≥ .
21If  ≥ , the agent would always favor investment over effort, and the analysis would be the same as in the
baseline model.
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When instead the agent has a high productivity in period 2, his expected payoff is Π2 (1) =
 [3 | 1 2 = ]. Consider now the behavior of a low-type agent in period 1 (1 = ). If the
agent does neither exert effort nor invest, then 1 =  and, in period 2:
• with probability 1− + , the performance is 2 = , leading the market to expect a
high productivity with probability ;
• with probability  (1− ), the performance is 2 = , thus revealing the low productivity
of the agent.
Thus, the agent’s expected payoff from neither investing nor exerting effort in period 1 is:
Π1
¯¯
1=1=0 = 
£
(1− )Π2 () + Π2 (;)
¤
= 2 [+ (1− )∆] + (1− + )  (2− 1) 2∆−  (11)
If instead the agent invests in period 1, he enhances both his current performance 1 from  to
 and his future productivity; there is then no point exerting effort, and his expected payoff
becomes:
Π1
¯¯
1=11=0
=  £Π2 () + (1− )Π2 ( ;)¤− 
= 2 [+ (1− )∆] + [+ (1− )  ]  (2− 1) 2∆− (1− )  −  (12)
Finally, the agent may choose to exert effort rather than to invest, in which case he only
enhances his current performance 1 and his expected payoff becomes:
Π1
¯¯
1=01=1
=  £(1− )Π2 () + Π2 ( ;)¤− 
= 2 [+ (1− )∆] + [1− +  ] (2− 1) 2∆−  −  (13)
Comparing these options yields:
Proposition 6 Suppose that the agent can invest at cost  and/or exert effort at cost   ;
then:
• In period 2, the agent never invests but exerts effort with positive probability in case of
low productivity (2 = ) when this is not too costly (namely, if  ≤ ∗ = (2− 1) ∆; in
period 1, the agent favours investment whenever its relative cost is not excessive (namely,
if   1 + (2− 1) ), and effort otherwise.
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• The incentive to enhance performance increases in each period with the discount factor 
and the performance differential ∆; in addition, it increases:
— over time: ∗1  0 or ∗1  0 imply ∗ = 1 and ∗  0, whereas we can have ∗  0,
∗  0 and ∗1 = ∗1 = 0;
— and with the agent’s reputation: ∗ ≥ ∗, with a strict inequality whenever 0  ∗ 
1.
• In the absence of information decay ( = 1), performance remains constant over time:
1 = 2; with information decay (  1), performance increases over time: 1 ≤ 2, with
a strict inequality whenever costs are in a moderate range.22
Proof. See Online Appendix B.
Long-term investment and short-term effort are substitutes in each period, and in the second
period the agent favors effort over investment, as the former is a cheaper way to deliver high
performance. However, in contrast with our baseline model, here the effort exerted in period
2 does not “crowd out” the incentives in the previous period: as 2 becomes less informative
about the agent’s type, delivering good performance becomes valuable also in period 1.23 In the
first period, the agent favors investment over effort when the cost difference is small enough,
as investment reduces the likelihood of having to exert effort in the next period. In the second
period, the agent has more incentives to hide bad news when he is supposed to be good:
 ≥ .24
Contrary to the baseline model where the agent can only invest, expected performance
increases as the market evaluation approaches only when there is information decay; discounting
alone does not suffice.25 Indeed, if  = 1, then when observing a bad performance in period
22Namely, when (i)  ≤ (2− 1) ∆, so that the agent exerts effort in period 2, but (ii)  and  are not too
low, so that ∗1 ∗1  1.
23Our formulation allows for “asymmetric ambiguity”: a bad performance  « reveals » a low productivity,
whereas a good performance  entertains some ambiguity, as it may be the result of the agent’s effort. More
generally, incentives to exert effort remain stronger in the second period whenever, due to information decay,
productivity estimates are ranked as “ ≤    ≤ ”.
24The literature on life-cycle effects in reputational models shows that incentives may either decrease or
increase with existing reputation; see Bar-Isaac and Tadelis (2008) for a survey. Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn
(2010) highlight the role of the learning process: when bad news reveal the agent’s type, as in our framework,
agents with better reputation have higher incentives to invest. The opposite result obtains when instead there
is perfect learning upon good news.
25In Grossman and Shapiro (1985), discounting alone explains why firms may devote more resources to
a project as the project nears completion. In their model, investment yields no return until the project is
completed, thus the marginal discounted benefit of investing increases as the project nears completion. In Rice
and Sen (2008), where both the agent and the principal progressively learn the agent’s type, discounting suffices
to generate increasing effort over time; however, the implications on the performance pattern are ambiguous.
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1 (1 = , thus revealing a bad productivity in that period), the market will expect for sure
a low productivity in the following periods, as investing in period 2 is not credible; this, in
turn, discourages the agent from exerting any effort in period 2:  = 0, and thus performance
remains low if it is low in the first period.
It is unfortunately difficult to plug this extended version of our baseline model into a re-
peated interaction setting, as now the market needs to keep track of the entire history of the
agent’s performance — the performance observed in the last period of a contract is no longer
a sufficient statistic of the agent’s past performance when the agent may exert effort in that
period. In particular, if the interaction is infinitely repeated (even if only with positive proba-
bility), then the environment is no longer stationary, as the agent’s relevant past history keeps
growing over time.
We can however draw on our analysis to make some general predictions for the case of
infinitely repeated interaction. If investment is not substantially more costly than effort, then
the equilibrium remains the same as in Section 3: in the last period of a contract the agent
will favor investment over effort, so as to save on future costs; but then, the performance in
that last period is a sufficient statistic for the agent’s past performance, which eliminates any
effort or investment incentives in the previous periods of the contract. When instead effort is
significantly cheaper than investment, then the agent will rather exert effort in the last period
of a contract, and may then choose to exert effort as well in the previous periods, so as to
entertain the ambiguity, or to invest in the early periods, so as to save on effort costs in later
periods. Thus, within the course of a contract, investment can precede effort but it cannot
be the other way round. The above analysis also suggests that incentives to “behave” will be
greater in the last periods of a contract than in the first ones, and that this pattern will be
more pronounced with longer contracts.
5 Conclusion
Underperformance in agency relationships may be a serious problem when performance is non-
verifiable and therefore cannot be contracted upon. However, when performance is (at least
partially) the result of the agent’s productivity, the agent may wish to build a reputation by
working harder or by investing to enhance his type; career concerns may then ease the moral
hazard problem.
We build on these insights to study the performance dynamics that career concerns generate
in multi-period contracts with volatile environments, and derive the implications for contract
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duration. Environment volatility generates information decay. Together with discounting and
crowding out, this reduces the agent’s incentives to invest in earlier periods of the contract. As
a result, expected performance improves towards the end of the contract.
Further, and opposite to what the current wisdom suggests, longer contracts generate greater
implicit incentives, as they reduce crowding out effects. As a result, longer contracts can be
optimal when the agent would otherwise be reluctant to invest, e.g., when the environment
is highly volatile, making the benefits from investment rather short-lived. Conversely, shorter
contracts can be optimal when investment has long-term effects on performance.
Keeping in line with standard career concern models, we mainly focused here on the case
where several principals compete for the same agent; however, it is shown in Appendix B that
the analysis applies as well to situations in which the agent interacts with a single principal, as
in the case of public procurement.26 These insights highlight the importance of granting some
discretion to public authorities in the selection of their contractors. Bymaking past performance
relevant for future contract opportunities, this discretion fosters the contractor’s incentives to
deliver good performance. This can be particularly important for public services, such as
educational services, clinical services and nursing homes, which involve many noncontractible
dimensions.27
Our model provides a number of testable predictions. A first prediction is that performance
(and/or investment or effort) improves significantly as contract renewal date approaches. A
second prediction is that performance falls after the contract is renewed, as the agent then
faces less reward for improving performance. Other things being equal, these patterns are
exacerbated with longer term contracts, as the incentive to enhance performance before the
contract is signed is further increased. Third, when investment exhibits decreasing returns to
scale, the performance pattern is exacerbated in environments with greater information decay,
as in sectors with high technological progress, unstable environments, or in sports. Fourth,
in procurement contexts we should expect these patterns to be more pronounced when the
procurement authority is allowed to exert her discretion, and thus to rely on nonverifiable
information about the contractor’s past performance, as is more often the case for private than
26In a previous version of the paper, we also considered the infinite repetition of the principal-agent relationship
presented in that Appendix; see Iossa and Rey (2010).
27The importance of granting discretion to public procurer to allow reputational forces to operate was initially
stressed by Kelman (1990). When he was the head of public procurement during the Clinton administration,
Kelman adopted more flexible purchasing practices common in the private sector, among which giving more
weight to suppliers’ past performance. Since the Federal Acquisitions Streamlining Act in 1994, US Federal
Departments and Agencies are expected to record past contractors’ performance evaluations and share them
through common platforms for use in future contractor selection. See Spagnolo (2012) for further details.
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for public procurement (e.g. this is the case for example in European public procurement).
Fifth, for industries in which both short-term performance-enhancing efforts and long-term
productivity investments are relevant options, effort should take place towards the end of the
contractual relationship whereas investment should rather take place earlier in the relationship.
Finally, for contracts where performance is difficult to verify and explicit incentives are hard
to enforce, longer contracts should be observed when the agent’s stakes are small, investment
is costly, and the environment is volatile.
Throughout the paper we have restricted our attention to a single agent’s investment incen-
tives. It would be interesting to extend the analysis to competing agents with heterogeneous
types and study how the duration of the contract may be affected by the competition among
agents.
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Appendix
A Proof of Corollary 1
The agent’s productivity is initially high or low with equal probability. As he never invests in
period 1, his expected performance is:
1 = +2 = +
∆
2

By contrast, in period 2, the performance is low only if the agent’s type is low and he does not
invest; as a result, the expected performance is
2 = + (1 + ∗2) ∆2 
The conclusion (2 ≥ 1) follows from ∗2 ≥ 0 (with a strict inequality when   ∗).
B Principal-agent relationship
We sketch here a variant in which a principal  can either delegate the provision of a service
to an agent  or keep it in-house. If in period   provides the service at price , then 
obtains a net payoff  −  whereas the agent obtains  −  − , where  ∈ © ª denotes
’s operating cost, with Pr() = . Keeping the provision in-house yields instead  for  ,
where  is uniformly distributed over £   ¤, and 0 for . The realization of  (resp.,  ) is
privately observed by  (resp.,  ) before contracting takes place.
At the beginning of period 3, upon observing the value  ,  makes a take-it-or-leave-it
price offer to . If  is optimistic about ’s future performance, she will offer a high price
 = , to ensure that  accepts the contract;  then enjoys a rent − in case of low cost. If
instead  is pessimistic about ’s future performance, she will either offer a low price  = ,
or keep the provision in-house; either way, the agent obtains no rent. This gives  an incentive
to enhance  ’s beliefs, which yields the same investment and performance patterns as in the
baseline model. For instance, in the baseline model in which the contract negotiation occurs at
 = 3, we have:
Proposition 7 The expected rent of the agent in period 3 increases with his previous perfor-
mance:
 [3 | 1 2] =  (3 (2)− ˆ) 
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where 3 (2) is given as before by (1), and  ≡ 
¡− ¢  ¡ −  ¢ measures the sensitivity
of the agent’s rent to his expected performance, compared with a target ˆ ≡  + 2 − . In
equilibrium, the agent never invests in period 1, whereas in period 2 he invests in case of low
productivity if   ∗ ≡  (2− 1) ∆; investment and performance thus exhibit the same
pattern as in the baseline model.
Proof. In period 3,  will favour offering a high price  over a low price  (and thus a fortiori
over in-house provision) when:
3 −   max
© ¡3 − ¢+ (1− )  ª⇐⇒ 3   + + − 1− 
’s expected rent is thus:
 [3 | 1 2] = Pr
Ã
 ≤ 3 − −
− 
1− 
!
 ¡− ¢
=
 ¡− ¢
 − 
Ã
3 − −
− 
1−  − 
!

which is of the form  (3 − ˆ), where the ratio  ≡ 
¡− ¢  ¡ −  ¢ and the performance
threshold ˆ ≡  + + −
1− are independent of ’s behavior. As before, 2 provides a sufficient
statistic for the agent performance in period 3: 3 = 3 (2), as given by (1). The analysis is
then formally the same as in the baseline model, scaling the expected benefits from investment,
1 and 2, by a factor : that is, in each period  a low-productivity agent ( = ) now seeks
to maximize ( − ) . The other conclusions follow.
C Proof of Proposition 3
In period 2, the agent chooses 2 so as to maximize 22− (2), where as before 2 = (2− 1) ∆;
hence ∗2  0 (as  (0) = 0 and 0 (0)  2) and increases with 2 (strictly so as long as it remains
lower than 1). In period 1, the agent maximizes 11 −  (1), where 1 :
1 = (2− 1)  [2 − {2∗2 −  (∗2)}] 
As (2− 1)   1 and 2∗2 −  (∗2) = max2 {22 −  (2)}  0; hence, 1  2. In addition,
∗1  1: ∗1 = 1 would imply ∗2 = 1 as well, in which case 1 = (2− 1)  (1)  0 (1), where the
inequality stems from (2− 1)   1 and  (1)  0 (1) by convexity; it follows that ∗1  ∗2.
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Suppose now that  () = , where   0 and   1. In that case,
∗ =
µ 

¶ 1−1 
and thus the ratio ∗1∗2 evolves as 12, which is equal to (with  ≡ (2− 1) ):
1
2 =
 [∆− {∆∗2 −  (∗2)}]
∆
=  − max2 {∆2 −  (2)}∆ 
Hence,

∆
µ1
2
¶
= − (
∗
2)
∆2  0
so that ∗1∗2 decreases with ∆, and (using the envelope theorem, i.e., 0 (∗2) = 2 = ∆):


µ1
2
¶
= 1− ∗2  0
so that ∗1∗2 increases with both  and .
D Proof of Lemma 1
By construction, 1 =  and, for   1:
 = −1 + (1− )
¡
1− −1
¢
=⇒ 2 − 1 = (2− 1)
¡
2−1 − 1
¢ 
Therefore, by iteration:
2 − 1 = (2− 1)−1
¡
21 − 1
¢
= (2− 1) =⇒  = 12 +
(2− 1)
2

Similarly, 1 = 1−  and, for   1:
 = −1 + (1− )
¡
1− −1
¢
=⇒ 2 − 1 = (2− 1)−1
¡
21 − 1
¢
=⇒  = 12 −
(2− 1)
2
= 1−  
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E Proof of Proposition 5
When the contracts are sufficiently lengthy to ensure that ∗ = 1, from (8) the expected welfare
is equal to:
 = 
1−  +
−1
1− 
1
2
£ ¡Π −Π¢− ¤
=
1−
1−
+
2
+ −1∆
2
1−  +
+
−1
2 (1− )
∙
1− (2− 1) 
1− (2− 1)  (2− 1) ∆− (2− 1)
  (∆− )− 
¸
=
1
1− 
+
2
+  1
2
µ ∆
1− (2− 1)  − 
¶

where
 ≡ 
 (1− (2− 1) )
1−  
In Online Appendix C we show that  decreases when  increases; hence it is never optimal
to choose a duration  larger than what is needed to induce ∗ = 1.
When instead ∗ = ˆ  1 using (7) and (9) the equilibrium welfare is of the form:
 = 1
1− 
+
2
+ 
µ
(2− 1) 
1− (2− 1)  −

∆
¶ ∆
2 
where
 ≡ 

1− 
1− (2− 1) 
(2− 1)  =
1− (2− 1) 
(2− 1) (1− )
increases with  — see Online Appendix D. Therefore, the optimal duration consists of choosing
 so that ˆ = 1. The comparative statics follows from Proposition 4, and in particular from
∗ increasing with , ∆,  and .
A similar analysis can be made for the evaluation of the expected performance generated
by the contract. As shown in Online Appendix E, as long as the equilibrium investment is
∗ = ˆ  1, the expected total discounted value of performance is of the form:
 = 1
1− 
+
2
+

1−  ˆ
1
1− (1− (2− 1) ) ∆
∆
2
=
1
1− 
+
2
+ 
µ
(2− 1) ∆
1− (2− 1)  − 
¶
1
∆− (1− (2− 1) ) 
∆
2 
whereas for ∗ = 1, it is equal to:
 = 1
1− 
+
2
+  1
1− (2− 1) 
∆
2 
As  increases whereas  decreases when  increases, it follows that, to maximize this expected
total performance, it is optimal to choose  so that ˆ = 1.
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Online Appendix
Not for publication
A Alternative baseline model without adverse selection
We consider here a variant of our baseline model in which the type  is not observable by
the agent either; in each period, the agent thus bases his investment decision only on his
performance history.
As before, enhancing performance in period 2 from 2 =  to 2 =  increases the agent’s
expected payoff by ∆Π3 = (2− 1) ∆. Consider now period 2, following a given investment
decision ˆ1 ∈ {0 1} taken in period 1 (here ˆ1 denotes the decision eventually taken by the
agent in period ; it is equal to 1 with probability 1 and to 0 with probability 1− 1), a given
performance 1 observed in that period (which is thus such that 1 =  if 1 =  or ˆ1 = 1,
and 1 =  otherwise).
If 1 = , then the agent and the market infer 1 = , and thus anticipate 2 =  with
probability . The agent thus chooses 2 so as to maximize:
Π2 = −2 +  {(1− + 2) (+ ∆) +  (1− 2) (+ (1− )∆)}
=  (+ ∆)− 2 −  (1− 2) (2− 1) ∆
=  (+ ∆)− (2− 1) ∆+ ¡2 − ¢ 2 (14)
where:
2 ≡ (2− 1) ∆ (15)
The optimal investment is thus 2 = 1 if   2 , and 2 = 0 if   2 .
If instead 1 = , then the agent and the market anticipate 2 =  with probability . The
agent thus chooses 2 so as to maximize:
Π2 = −2 +  {(+ (1− ) 2) (+ ∆) + (1− ) (1− 2) (+ (1− )∆)}
=  (+ ∆)− 2 − (1− ) (1− 2) (2− 1) ∆
=  (+ ∆)− (2− 1) (1− ) ∆+ ¡2 − ¢ 2 (16)
where:
2 ≡ (2− 1) (1− ) ∆ (17)
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The optimal investment is thus 2 = 1 if   2 , and 2 = 0 if   2. Note that 2  2
whenever there is information decay (  1):
2 − 2 = (2− 1)2 ∆  0
Therefore, substituting for the equilibrium values of 2 in (14) and (16):
• If   2 , the agent always invests in period 2: 2 = 2 = 1; his payoff is then:
Π2 = Π2 =  (+ ∆)− 
• If instead 2    2 , the agent invests in period 2 only when 1 = : 2 = 0  2 = 1;
his payoff is then:
Π2 =  (+ ∆)− 
Π2 =  (+ (1− 2 (1− ))∆) 
• Finally, if   2 , the agent never invests in period 2: 2 = 2 = 0; his payoff is then:
Π2 =  (+ 2 (1− )∆) 
Π2 =  (+ (1− 2 (1− ))∆) 
Consider now period 1. The agent chooses 1 so as to maximize:
Π1 = −1 + 
½
1 + 1
2
Π2 + 1− 12 Π

2
¾
= Π

2 +Π2
2
+ (1 − ) 1
where
1 ≡ Π

2 −Π2
2
 (18)
The expected payoff differential Π2 −Π2 is by construction non-negative28 and, using (14) and
(16), can be expressed as:
Π2 −Π2 = (2− 1)2 ∆+
¡2 − ¢ 2 − ¡2 − ¢ 2
=
¡
1− 2
¢
(2− 1)2 ∆+ ¡− 2 ¢ ¡2 − 2 ¢ 
Therefore:
28We have:
Π2 = max2 { (+ ∆)− 2 −  (1− 2) (2− 1) ∆}
≤ max2 { (+ ∆)− 2 − (1− ) (1− 2) (2− 1) ∆} = Π

2 
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• If   2 , the agent always invests in period 2: 2 = 2 = 1, and thus Π2 = Π2 ; hence,
the agent does not invest in period 1: ∗1 = 0.
• If instead 2    2 , the agent invests in period 2 only when 1 = : 2 = 0  2 = 1,
and thus:
1 =  − 

2
2
 
implying again that the agent does not invest in period 1: ∗1 = 0.
• Finally, if   2 , the agent never invests in period 2: 2 = 2 = 0, and thus:
1 = (2− 1)
2 2∆
2
 2 = (2− 1) ∆ (19)
implying again that the agent does not invest in period 1 (as here   2  1).
This leads to:
Proposition 8 (i) The agent never invests in period 1, but invests in period 2 if the cost is
sufficiently low:
∗ = 1 if and only if  = 2 and  ≤ 12 
where 1 denotes the performance observed in period 1 and
2 ≡ (2− 1) ∆  2 ≡ (2− 1) (1− ) ∆  0
(ii) The incentive to invest in period 2 therefore increases with the discount factor  and
the performance differential ∆, relative to the cost ; it however decreases with the performance
observed in the first period.
(iii) Following a bad performance, the incentive to invest in period 2 increases with the
degree of information persistence ; following a good performance, however, it increases with
information persistence only when this is initially low (namely, in the range   34).
The insights of our baseline model thus carry over. Part (i), for instance, follows directly from
the fact that the performance in period 2 is a sufficient statistic for predicting the performance
in period 3. Interestingly, however, the incentive to invest increases over time even in the
absence of information decay or of discounting: there is an additional “option value” in waiting
and observing 1 before deciding whether to invest.29 Likewise, in part (ii) the comparative
29This is reflected in the term − 12   in (19), rewritten as:
1 = 
µ
− 1
2
¶
(2− 1) ∆  2 = (2− 1) ∆
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statics on , ∆ and  build on the same intuition as before; in addition, incentives decrease
with existing reputation as the payoff from investing (net of ) is the same regardless of past
performance, whilst the payoff from not investing is lower when past performance is low. Part
(iii) follows from information persistence raising the payoff from investing, and lowering (resp.,
raising) the payoff from not investing when past performance is low (resp., high).
An implication of Proposition 8 is that, on average, the agent’s performance improves as
the market evaluation approaches: the expected performance in period 1 is equally likely to
be  or , as the agent never invests in that period; in the second period, the performance is
more likely to be good when the agent invests with positive probability, which is the case when
  2 . Therefore:
Corollary 2 The expected performance (weakly) increases as the market evaluation approaches:
1 ≤ 2, with a strict inequality when   2 .
Proof. The agent’s productivity is initially high or low with equal productivity. As he never
invests in period 1, his expected performance is:
1 = +2 = +
∆
2

By contrast, in period 2, the performance is low only if the agent’s type is low and he does not
invest; as a result, the expected performance is
2 =
£+ (1− ) 2 ¤ + (1− ) ¡1− 2 ¢
2
+
£
1− + 2
¤ +  ¡1− 2 ¢
2
= + ¡1 + (1− ) 2 + 2 ¢ ∆2 
The conclusion (2 ≥ 1) follows from 2  2 ≥ 0 (with a strict inequality for 2 when   2 ).
B Proof of Proposition 6
As already noted: (i) the agent never invests in period 2, as exerting effort is less costly and
produces the same benefit on his expected payoff; and (ii) in period 1, the agent may either
invest or exert effort, but never does both. What remains to be determined is: (i) the probability
 of effort in period 2, as a function of the performance  ∈ {} observed in period 1; and
(i) the probability of effort 1, or of investment 1, in the first period.
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B.1 No information decay ( = 1)
We first consider the case where  = 1. When 1 = , the agent then remains productive
forever and thus never needs to invest or exert effort. If instead 1 = , and the agent neither
invests nor exerts efforts in period 1 then, observing  =  in period 1 reveals that the agent has
a low productivity; as investing is not credible in period 2, the market will then anticipate that
the agent will still have a low productivity in period 3, and thus the agent never exerts effort
in period 2. The agent can instead enhance his performance and the market beliefs, either by
investing in period 1, or by exerting effort in both periods (exerting effort in period 1 only would
be a dominated strategy, as a low performance in period 2 would reveal his low productivity).
In a candidate equilibrium in which the agent invests in period 1, the market then believes
that the agent is highly productive and the gain from investment is 2∆ − . As the agent
could deviate either by exerting effort in both periods or do nothing, it follows that investing
constitutes an equilibrium strategy if
2∆−  ≥ 0 2∆− (1 + ) 
In a candidate equilibrium in which the agent exerts effort with probability 1 in period 1, the
market then remains uncertain about the agent’s productivity and the gain from investment is
2∆ (1 + 1)− (1 + ) . As the agent could deviate either by investing or by doing nothing,
it follows that exerting effort constitutes an equilibrium strategy if
2∆
1 + 1 − (1 + )  ≥ 0
2∆
1 + 1 − 
Finally, in a candidate equilibrium in which the agent neither invests nor exerts effort, by
deviating the agent would convince the market that he has a high productivity; therefore,
doing nothing constitutes an equilibrium strategy if
0 ≥ 2∆−  2∆− (1 + ) 
Comparing these conditions, we obtain that:
• if   (1 + ) , then the agent never exerts effort, and invests in period 1 when he has a
low productivity if   2∆ (in the limit case where  = 2∆, then the agent invests with
any probability 1 ∈ [0 1]);
• if   (1 + ) , then the agent never invests, and exerts effort in both periods when he
has a low productivity if   2∆
2(1+) (in the limit case where  = 2∆2(1+) , then the agent
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exerts effort in period 1 with any probability 1 ∈ [0 1], in which case he exerts effort also
in period 2);
• if  = (1 + ) , then:
— if   2∆, there exists an equilibrium in which the agent invests in period 1 (or
with any probability ∗1 ∈ [0 1] in the limit case where  = 2∆);
— if   2∆
1+ , there exists an equilibrium in which the agent exerts effort in period
1 with some probability ∗1  0, in which case he exerts effort also in period 2 (if
  2∆
2(1+) , then ∗1 = 1);
• in all cases, the performance remains constant over time: 1 = 2 =  if the agent invests
in period 1 or exerts effort in both periods, and 1 = 2 =  otherwise.
B.2 Information decay (  1)
We now turn to the case of information decay:  ∈ (12 1). In period 2 a low-productivity
agent exerts effort if condition (10) holds, which in equilibrium amounts to:
 ≤  () ≡ (2− 1)  ()∆ (20)
where  (), the equilibrium market belief following  ∈ {} in period 1 and  in period
2, is given by:30
 () ≡ + (1− ) 1+ (1− ) 1 + (1− + 1)   (21)
 () ≡ 1− 
1− +   (22)
As  decreases when  increases, the equilibrium effort of a low-productivity agent in period
2, following a performance  ∈ {} in period 1, is given by:
∗ =
⎧
⎨
⎩
0 if  ≥  ( = 0) 
1 if  ≤  ( = 1) 
ˆ s.t.  (ˆ) =  otherwise.
(23)
Furthermore,  (0) =  (0) and, for   0,  ()   ():
 ()
 () =
1 + 
1−
1 + 1−+1+(1−)1 
 1 (24)
30 and thus  depend on both  and 1; when there is no risk of confusion, we drop the argument 1
to simplify the exposition.
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where the inequality stems from 1−+1+(1−)1  1− (which amounts to (1− )2  2). Therefore,
 (0) =  (0) = (2− 1) ∆ and  ()   () for   0. It follows that: (i) ∗ and ∗
are both positive when   (2− 1) ∆, and they are both equal to 0 if  ≥ (2− 1) ∆; (ii)
∗ ≥ ∗, with a strict inequality whenever 0  ∗  1.
Next, we note that the agent neither invests nor exerts effort in period 1 when, in case of a
high performance in period 1, it has little incentive to exert effort in period 2:
Lemma 2 Suppose ∗  1. Then ∗1 = ∗1 = 0.
Proof. To see this, note first that ∗  1 implies ∗ (≤ ∗)  1; therefore, in period 2, and
for any given performance  ∈ {} observed in period 1, the equilibrium market belief ∗
must be such that agent either does not exert effort (whenever ∗ = 0), or is indifferent between
exerting effort or not (if ∗ = ˆ); it follows that in period 1, the expected payoffs from investing,
exerting effort, and doing nothing are respectively given by:
Π1 (1 = 1 1 = 0) = 2 [+ (1− )∆] + ∗ (2− 1) 2∆− 
Π1 (1 = 0 1 = 1) = 2 [+ (1− )∆] + (1− ) ∗ (2− 1) 2∆− 
Π1 (1 = 1 = 0) = 2 [+ (1− )∆] + (1− ) ∗ (2− 1) 2∆
Therefore, the benefit from investing or exerting effort cannot exceed
∗ (2− 1) 2∆  ∗ (2− 1) ∆
where the right-hand side does not exceed  (and thus ) when ∗  1.
As ∗  1 implies ∗1 = 0, this requires:
   ( = 1)|∗1=0 =  (2− 1) ∆ (25)
Conversely, under (25), we must have ∗1 = 0: to see this, note that
 ( = 1) = (2− 1)  ( = 1)∆
where:
 ( = 1) = + (1− ) 1
1 + 1
decreases as 1 increases; but then ∗1  0 would imply ∗ = 1 and thus require  
 ( = 1) ≤  ( = 1)|∗1=0 =  (2− 1) ∆, a contradiction. It follows that, under (25),
there exists a unique equilibrium, in which the agent (i) never invests, (ii) never exerts effort
in period 1, and (iii) in period 2:
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• if  ≥ (2− 1) ∆, the agent never exerts effort;
• if (2− 1) ∆     (2− 1) ∆ then, given the performance  ∈ {} observed in
period 1, the agent exerts effort with probability ˆ in case of low productivity.
From now on, we focus on the case  ≤  (2− 1) ∆. In period 2 we must then have
• ∗ = 1: ∗  1 would imply ∗1 = 0 and thus require    ( = 1)|∗1=0 =
 (2− 1) ∆, a contradiction.
• ∗  0: ∗ = 1  0 implies  (0) =  (0)  ; we thus have:
— if  ≤  (1) = (1− ) (2− 1) ∆, ∗ = 1;
— otherwise ∗ = ˆ  0 is such that  =  (ˆ) = (2− 1)  (ˆ)∆, or:
 = 1− 
1− + ˆ (2− 1) ∆ ⇐⇒ ˆ =
1− 

µ
(2− 1) ∆
 − 1
¶
 (26)
In period 1, the comparison between the expected payoffs from investing and from exerting
effort, given respectively by (12) and (13) shows, using ∗ = 1, that the agent favors effort over
investment when:
  [1 + (2− 1) ]  (27)
and favors instead investment over effort when the inequality is reversed.
Suppose first that (27) holds, in which case the agent never invests (∗1 = 0). Comparing
(11) and (13), in period 1 the agent then exerts effort if:
 ≤ (1− + 
∗) ∗ − (1− + ∗) ∗
1 + (∗ − ∗)  (2− 1) 
2∆
which, using ∗ = 1 and (22), can be written as:
 ≤  (1; ∗) ≡ 
∗ (1)− (1− )
1 + (1− ∗)  (2− 1) 
2∆
where:
∗ (1) ≡  (∗ = 1; 1) = + (1− ) 11 + 1 
As ∗ , and thus , decreases as 1 increases, it follows that ∗1  0 when (using ∗ (0) = ):
   (0; ∗) = (2− 1)
2 2∆
1 + (1− ∗)  
Two cases can be distinguished, depending on the value of ∗:
38
• If  ≤  (1) = (1− ) (2− 1) ∆, then ∗ = 1 and :
 (0; ∗ = 1) = (2− 1)2 2∆
which lies below (1− ) (2− 1) ∆ if and only if (2− 1)   1− , or
  ˆ ≡ 1 + 
1 + 2 
• If (1− ) (2− 1) ∆   ≤ (2− 1) ∆, then ∗ = ˆ and:
   (0; ∗ = ˆ) = (2− 1)
2 2∆
1 + 
³
1− 1−
³
(2−1)∆
 − 1
´´ ⇐⇒    (2− 1) 2∆
1 +  
where the right-hand side is lower than  (2− 1) ∆, and lies above (1− ) (2− 1) ∆
if and only if   ˆ:
 (2− 1) 2∆
1 +  − (1− )  (2− 1)∆ = (− ˆ)  (2− 1)∆
1 + 2
1 +  
Summing-up, we have: ∗1  0 if
  ˆ ≡
⎧
⎨
⎩
(2− 1) 2∆ if   ˆ
 (2− 1) 2∆
1 +  if  ≥ ˆ

and ∗1 = 0 if  ≥ ˆ.
Likewise, we have ∗1 = 1 when
 ≤  (1; ∗) = (2− 1)
2 2
1 + (1− ∗) 
∆
2

Therefore:
• If  ≤  (1) = (1− ) (2− 1) ∆, then ∗ = 1 and:
 (1; ∗ = 1) = (2− 1)2 2∆2 
which lies below (1− ) (2− 1) ∆ if and only if
  ˜ ≡ 2 + 
2 (1 + ) 
as can be seen from:
(2− 1)2 2∆
2
− (1− ) (2− 1) ∆ = [(2− 1)  − 2 (1− )] (2− 1) ∆
2
= (− ˜) (2− 1)  (1 + )∆
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• If (1− ) (2− 1) ∆   ≤ (2− 1) ∆, then ∗ = ˆ and:
   (1; ∗ = ˆ) = (2− 1)
2 2
1 + 
³
1− 1−
³
(2−1)∆
 − 1
´´∆
2
⇐⇒   (2− 1) 
2∆
2 (1 + ) 
where the right-hand side is lower than  (2− 1) ∆, and lies above (1− ) (2− 1) ∆
if and only if   ˜:
(2− 1) 
2∆
2 (1 + ) − (1− ) (2− 1) ∆ = (− ˜) (2− 1) ∆
Summing-up, we have: ∗1 = 1 if:
 ≤ ˜ ≡
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(2− 1) 2∆
2
if   ˜
(2− 1) 
2
1 + 
∆
2
if  ≥ ˜

and ∗1  1 if   ˜.
Suppose now that:
  [1 + (2− 1) ]  (28)
in which case the agent never exerts effort in period 1 (i.e., ∗1 = 0), as he favors investment
over effort in that period. We thus have:
∗ = + (1− ) ∗  
∗ =
1− 
1− + ∗ 
Using this and ∗ = 1, in period 1 the expected payoffs from investing and from not investing
are respectively given by:
Π1 (1 = 1 = 0) = 2 [+ (1− )∆] + (1− ) (2− 1) 2∆− ∗
Π1 (1 = 1 1 = 0) = −+ 2 [+ (1− )∆] +  (2− 1) 2∆−  (1− ) 
Therefore, the agent indeed invests in period 1 if:
 ≤  (∗) ≡ (2− 1)2 2∆+ [∗ − (1− )]  (29)
Two cases can again be distinguished, depending on the value of ∗:
• If    (1) = (1− ) (2− 1) ∆, then ∗ = 1 and (29) becomes:
 ≤  (∗ = 1) = (2− 1)2 2∆+ (2− 1) 
This condition is less demanding than (28) as long as:
  (2− 1)2 2∆
Hence, in the range   (1− ) (2− 1) ∆):
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— if  ≥ ˆ, which implies 1−   (2− 1) , (29) is always less demanding than (28);
— if   ˆ, (29) is less demanding than (28) as long as   (2− 1)2 2∆, and more
demanding for (2− 1)2 2∆    (1− ) (2− 1) ∆.
• If (1− ) (2− 1) ∆   ≤ (2− 1) ∆, then ∗ = ˆ and (29) becomes:
 ≤  (∗ = ˆ) = 2 (2− 1) ∆− 2 (1− ) 
As the right-hand side decreases when  increases, this condition is more demanding than
(28) for
   (2− 1) 
2∆
1 +  
where the right-hand side is lower than (2− 1) ∆ and, as already noted, lies above (resp.,
below) (1− ) (2− 1) ∆ if   ˆ (resp.,   ˆ). Hence, in the range (1− ) (2− 1) ∆ 
 ≤ (2− 1) ∆:
— if  ≥ ˆ, (29) is less demanding than (28) as long as (1− ) (2− 1) ∆   
(2−1)2∆
1+ , and more demanding for
(2−1)2∆
1+    (2− 1)2 2∆;
— if   ˆ, (29) is always more demanding than (28).
Summing-up:
• If  ≥ (2− 1) ∆, the agent never invests nor exerts effort.
• If (2− 1) ∆     (2− 1) ∆ then the agent (i) never invests, (ii) never exerts effort
in period 1, and (iii) in period 2, given the performance  ∈ {} observed in period 1,
the agent exerts effort with probability ˆ in case of low productivity.
• If    (2− 1) ∆, then the agent exerts effort with positive probability in case of low
productivity in period 2: ∗ = 1 and ∗  0; in addition, in case of low productivity in
period 1:
— If   ˆ, then the agent (see Figure 1a):
∗ invests (∗1 = 1) if

  1 + (2− 1)  and    (2− 1) 
2∆− 2 (1− ) 
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∗ exerts instead effort with positive probability (∗1  0) if

  1 + (2− 1)  and  
 (2− 1) 2∆
1 +  
with ∗1 = 1 if  ≤ ˜, and ∗1  1 if   ˜,
∗ neither invest nor exert effort otherwise.
— If   ˆ, then the agent (see Figure 1b):
∗ invests (∗1 = 1) if   1 + (2− 1)  and
  max©(2− 1)2 2∆+ (2− 1)   (2− 1) 2∆− 2 (1− ) ª 
∗ exerts effort with positive probability (∗1  0) if   1 + (2− 1)  and
  (2− 1)2 2∆
with ∗1 = 1 if  ≤ ˜, and ∗1  1 if   ˜,
∗ and neither invest nor exert effort otherwise.
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Figure 1b:   ˆ
The comparative statics follow. In particular, it can be checked that the region in which there
is either investment or effort in case of low productivity in period 1 expands as either  or ∆
increases.
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We now compare the expected performance in the two periods. Obviously, the expected
performance remains unchanged and equal to  = +2 =  + ∆2 in the absence of any
investment or effort, which occurs when  ≥ (2− 1) ∆. Let us now focus on the case where
  (2− 1) ∆, in which case ∗  ∗  0.
• If ∗1 = ∗1 = 0, then
1 = + ∆2
2 = + 12 [+ (1− ) 
∗ ]∆+ 12 (1− + 
∗)∆
= + [1 + (1− ) ∗ + ∗] ∆2 
Therefore:
2 − 1 = [(1− ) ∗ + ∗] ∆2  0
where the inequality follows from ∗  ∗  0.
• If ∗1  ∗1 = 0, then ∗ = 1 and ∗  0; therefore:
1 = + 1 + 
∗
1
2
∆
2 = + 12∆+
1
2
[1− +  (∗1 + (1− ∗1) ∗)]∆
and thus:
2 − 1 = (1− ∗1) [1−  (1− ∗)] ∆2 
Therefore, 2 ≥ 1, with a strict inequality whenever ∗1  1.
• Finally, if ∗1  ∗1 = 0, then again ∗ = 1 and ∗  0, and thus
1 = + 12 (1 + 
∗
1)∆
2 = + 12 (1 + 
∗
1)∆+ 12 (1− 
∗
1) (1− + ∗)∆
which yields:
2 − 1 = (1− ∗1) [1−  (1− ∗)] ∆2 
Therefore, 2 ≥ 1, with a strict inequality whenever ∗1  1.
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C The factor  decreases with 
The factor  is of the form
 = 
where
 ≡ 1− (2− 1)
 
1− 
decreases as  increases; to show this, it suffices to note that log () indeed decreases as 
increases:31
 log ()
 =

 (log (1− (2− 1)
 )− log (1− ))
=
 log ()
1−  −
(2− 1)  log ((2− 1) )
1− (2− 1) 
=  ()−  ( (2− 1)) 
where  () ≡ 
1− log () is an increasing function of  for   1:
 0 () = 
 (−1 log  + −1)− −1 log 
(1− )2 =
−1 − (1− )−1 log 
(1− )2  0
D The factor  increases with 
 ≡ 

1− 
1− (2− 1) 
(2− 1)  =
1− (2− 1) 
(2− 1) (1− )
log () ≡ log ()− log ((2− 1) )− log (1− ) + log (1− (2− 1) )
 log ()
 =
 log ()
 −
(2− 1)  log ((2− 1) )
(2− 1)  +
 log ()
1−  −
(2− 1)  log ((2− 1) )
1− (2− 1) 
= log ()− log ((2− 1) ) +  ()−  ((2− 1) ) 
where the functions log () and  () = 
1− log () are both increasing in .
E Expected quality
Let   (resp.,   ) denote the expected value of the quality generated by the contract when
the quality was  or the agent invested in period 0. We have:
  =  + 
£   + ¡1−  ¢  ¤  (30)
  =  + 
£  + ¡1− ¢  ¤  (31)
31Note: 
 =
 (exp ( log ))
 = (exp ( log )) (log ) = 
 (log ) 
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and thus:
 = 
 +  
2
=  + 
∙
 +
µ
 − 1
2
¶¡  −   ¢¸
=
 +  ¡ − 12¢ ¡  −   ¢
1− 
=
 +  2
¡  −   ¢
1−   (32)
From (30) and (31), we have:
  −   =  −  + 
¡ − ¢ ¡  −   ¢
=
 − 
1− ( − )
=
 − 
1− (2− 1)  (1− ) 
which, using
 −  =
X
=1
−1 ¡ −  ¢∆− −1 ¡ −  ¢ ∆
=
X
=1
(2− 1) −1∆− (2− 1) −1∆
=
1− (2− 1) 
1− (2− 1)  (2− 1)∆− (2− 1)
 −1∆
=
µ
1− (2− 1) 
1− (2− 1)  − (2− 1)
−1 −1
¶
(2− 1)∆
leads to:
  −   =
1−(2−1)
1−(2−1) − (2− 1)−1 −1
1− (2− 1)  (1− ) (2− 1)∆ (33)
=
 +  2
¡  −   ¢
1− 
Combining (32) and (33) then yields:
 =
 + 
1−(2−1)
1−(2−1) −(2−1)−1
1−(2−1)(1−) (2− 1) ∆2
1−  
where
 =
X
=1
−1+
2
+ −1 ˆ
2
∆ = 1− 

1− 
+
2
+ −1ˆ∆
2

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This leads to:
 =
1−
1−
+
2
+ −1∆2 + 
1−(2−1)
1−(2−1) −(2−1)−1−1
1−(2−1)(1−) (2− 1) ∆2
1− 
=
1
1− 
+
2
+
−1∆2 + −1
1−(2−1)
1−(2−1) −(2−1)−1−1
1−(2−1)(1−) (2− 1) ∆2
1− 
=
1
1− 
+
2
+
−1∆2
1− 
Ã
1 +
1−(2−1)
1−(2−1) − (2− 1)−1 −1
1− (2− 1)  (1− ) (2− 1) 
!

For  = ∗ = 1, this boils down to:
 ∗ = 11− 
+
2
+
−1∆
2
1− 
µ
1 +
µ
1− (2− 1) 
1− (2− 1)  − (2− 1)
−1 −1
¶
(2− 1) 
¶
=
1
1− 
+
2
+
−1∆
2
1− 
µ
1− (2− 1) 
1− (2− 1) 
¶
=
1
1− 
+
2
+  1
1− (2− 1) 
∆
2 
As  decreases when  increases, the expected quality  ∗ decreases as contracts last longer
than needed to induce ∗ = 1.
For  = ∗ = ˆ ≤ 1, we have
 = 1
1− 
+
2
+
−1ˆ∆2
1− 
Ã
1 +
1−(2−1)
1−(2−1) − (2− 1)−1 −1ˆ
1− (2− 1)  (1− ˆ) (2− 1) 
!

where, using (7) and after simplification
1 +
1−(2−1)
1−(2−1) − (2− 1)−1 −1ˆ
1− (2− 1)  (1− ˆ) (2− 1)  = 1 +

∆
1
1−(2−1) − ∆

Therefore:
 = 1
1− 
+
2
+

1−  ˆ
1
1− (1− (2− 1) ) ∆
∆
2
=
1
1− 
+
2
+ 
µ
(2− 1) 
1− (2− 1)  −

∆
¶
1
1− (1− (2− 1) ) ∆
∆
2 
which, as , increases with .
F Contract duration, investment and welfare with con-
vex costs
To check the robustness of our insights on optimal contract duration, we consider here an infi-
nitely repeated setting with convex investment costs: improving productivity with probability
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 costs  (), where  (0) = 0, 0 (0) ≥ 0 and 00 ()  0; for some of the results, we will fur-
ther index the cost function by some parameter , where 2()  
3()
2 ≥ 0, with at least one
strict inequality. In this setting, we compare investment patterns and welfare under one-period
contracting and two-period contracting.
F.1 Investment patterns
We first show that investment exhibits similar patterns as in the case of constant returns to
scale.
• One-period contracting. Under one period contracting, the agent’s expected payoff
at the beginning of a contract, conditional on the performance  ∈ {} in the previous
contract, is given by:
Π =  − (1− )  () +  £(+ (1− ))Π + (1− ) (1− )Π¤ 
Π =  −  () +  £(1− + )Π +  (1− )Π¤ 
where:
 = + [+ (1− )]∆
 = + (1− + )∆
The equilibrium level of investment, ∗, solves 0 (∗) =  (∗), where:
 () ≡  ¡Π −Π¢ =  £ −  + (2− 1)  () + (2− 1) (1− )  ¡Π −Π¢¤
=  (1− )∆+  ()
1−  (1− ) 
with  ≡  (2− 1)  1. Note that, as in the case of constant returns to scale, crowding
out limits the investment level: ∗  1, as it is never optimal to invest merely to reduce the
investment cost in the next period:
 (1) =  (1)   (1)  0 (1) 
The equilibrium condition 0 (∗) =  (∗) amounts to  (∗∆ ) = 0, where
 (;∆ ) ≡  [(1− )∆+  ()]− [1−  (1− )] 0 ()  (34)
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with

 = −∆− [1−  (1− )] 
00
()  0

∆ =  (1− )  0

 = (1− )∆+  () + (1− ) 
0()  0

 = 

 ( )− [1−  (1− )]
2
 ( )
= − (1− ) 
2
 ( ) + 


∙
 ( )−  ( )
¸
= − (1− ) 
2
 ( ) + 


½Z 
0
∙
 ( )−

 ( )
¸

¾
= − (1− ) 
2
 ( )− 


∙Z 
0
Z 

2
2 ( ) 
¸
= − (1− ) 
2
 ( )− 
Z 
0
Z 

3
2 ( )   0
Hence, the equilibrium investment level ∗ increases with the investment benefit ∆ as well as
with  (that is, with the discount rate  and with the degree of information persistence ), and
decreases with the cost parameter . In particular, ∗ = 0 when 0 (0) ≥  (0) = ∆
1− , whereas
∗ tends to 1 as ∆ goes to +∞.32
• Two-period contracting. Let us now turn to two-period contracting; we will use the
subscript  = 1 2 to refer to the first or second period of a contract. The agent’s expected payoff
at the beginning of a contract, conditional on the performance  ∈ {} delivered at the end
of the previous contract, is given by:
Π1 = 1 − (1− )  (1)−  (1− ) (1− 1)  (2) + 
£2 Π1 + ¡1− 2 ¢Π1 ¤ 
Π1 = 1 −  (1)−  (1− 1)  (2) + 
£2Π1 + ¡1− 2 ¢Π1 ¤ 
32This is because  () tends to infinity with ∆ when  remains bounded away from 1. For instance, when
 () = + 22, then ∗ = 0 as long as ∆1− ≤  and, for ∆1−  :
∗ = 1− 
µ
1 +
∆
1− 
¶⎛⎜⎜⎝
vuuut1 + 21− 
∆
1− − ³
1 + ∆1−
´2 − 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ 
which decreases with  and increases from 0 to 1 as ∆ goes from  ( (1− ))−1 to infinity.
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where:
1 = + [+ (1− ) 1]∆+ 
¡+ 2 ∆¢ 
1 = + (1− + 1)∆+ 
¡+ 2∆¢ 
2 = [+ (1− ) 1] [+ (1− )2] + (1− ) (1− 1) (1− + 2) 
2 = (1− + 1) [+ (1− )2] + [+ (1− ) 1] (1− + 2) 
The second-period equilibrium level of investment, ∗2, thus solves 0 (∗2) = 2 (∗1 ∗2), where
(using 2 − 2 =
£
(2− 1) +  ¡2 − 2 ¢¤∆ and 2 − 2 = (2− 1)2 (1− 1) (1− 2)):
2 (1 2) ≡  ¡Π1 −Π1 ¢ = {1 − 1 + (2− 1)  (1) +  (2− 1)2 (1− 1)  (2)
+ 2 ¡2 − 2 ¢ ¡Π1 −Π1 ¢}
= 

1 − 1 + (2− 1)  (1) +  (2− 1)2 (1− 1)  (2)
1− 2 (2 − 2 )
=  (1− 1) [1 +  (1− 2)]∆+  (1) +  (1− 1)  (2)
1− 2 (1− 1) (1− 2) 
In the first period of a contract, when the productivity is low (i.e., 1 = ), the agent’s
expected payoff in the second period of a contract is given by:
−  (1) + 1 ©Π1 + (1− ) £Π1 −  (2) +  ¡Π1 −Π1 ¢ 2¤ª
+ (1− 1)  ©(1− ) Π1 +  £Π1 −  (2) +  ¡Π1 −Π1 ¢ 2¤ª
=  ©(1− ) Π1 +  £Π1 −  (2) +  ¡Π1 −Π1 ¢ 2¤ª
−  (1) + 1 (2− 1)  © ¡Π1 −Π1 ¢ (1− 2) +  (2)ª 
Therefore, the first-period equilibrium level of investment, ∗1, solves 0 (∗1) = 1 (∗1 ∗2), where,
using  ¡Π1 −Π1 ¢ = 2 (1 2):
1 (1 2) ≡  [ (2) + 2 (1 2) (1− 2)] 
Letting ∗ ≡  (∗1 ∗2) denote the equilibrium investment benefits, for  = 1 2, we thus have:
∗1 = ∗2 −  [∗2∗2 −  (∗2)] = ∗2 − max2 [
∗
22 −  (2)] ≤ ∗2  ∗2
Hence, as in the case of constant returns to scale, there is less investment in the first period
than in the second period: either ∗1 = ∗2 = 0, or ∗1  ∗2; however, as in Proposition 3, the
pattern can be less pronounced than with constant returns (namely, ∗1 can be positive), as it is
here desirable to smooth investment costs across periods. Furthermore, ∗2 = 0 (which implies
∗1 = 0) if and only if 0 (0) ≥ 2 (0 0) = ∆1− .
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• Comparison. Under two-period contracting, there is thus less investment in the first
period than in the second period; this, in turn, limits crowding out and fosters investment
incentives in the last contracting periods. Indeed, we now show that, as in the case of constant
returns to scale, there is more investment in the last period of second-period contracts than
under one-period contracting:
Proposition 9 When 0 (0) ≥ ∆
1− , ∗1 = ∗2 = ∗ = 0. When instead 0 (0)  ∆1− , ∗2  ∗  0.
Proof. We already noted that both ∗ and ∗2 are 0 when 0 (0) ≥ ∆1− , in which case ∗1 ≤
∗2 implies ∗1 = 0 as well. Conversely, ∗2 ∗  0 when 0 (0)  ∆1− . Suppose now that 0  ∗2 ≤ ∗.
From the above, this implies ∗1  ∗2 (≤ ∗). We then have:
• ∗2   (∗2). By construction:
2 (∗2 ∗2) =  (∗2) 
Therefore, it suffices to note that 2 (1 ∗2) strictly decreases with 1 in the range 1 ∈
[∗1 ∗2]:
2
1 (1 
∗
2) = 
½
[1− 2 (1− 1) (1− ∗2)] {− [1 +  (1− ∗2)]∆+ 0 (1)−  (∗2)}−2 (1− ∗2) {(1− 1) [1 +  (1− ∗2)]∆+  (1) +  (1− 1)  (∗2)}
¾
[1− 2 (1− 1) (1− ∗2)]2
= − [1 +  (1− 
∗
2)]∆−  (∗2) + (1)
[1− 2 (1− 1) (1− ∗2)]2
where
 (1) ≡ £1− 2 (1− 1) (1− ∗2)¤ 0 (1)− 2 (1− ∗2)  (1) 
0 (1) = £1− 2 (1− 1) (1− ∗2)¤ 00 (1)  0
Therefore, for 1 ≤ ∗2 ≤ ∗, we have  (1) ≤  (∗2) and thus:
2
1 (1 
∗
2) ≤ − [1 +  (1− 
∗
2)]∆−  (∗2) + (∗2)
[1− 2 (1− 1) (1− ∗2)]2
= − [1 +  (1− 
∗
2)] {∆+  (∗2)− [1−  (1− ∗2)] 0 (∗2)}
[1− 2 (1− 1) (1− ∗2)]2
=
− [1 +  (1− ∗2)]
[1− 2 (1− 1) (1− ∗2)]2
 (∗2) 
where
 (2) ≡ ∆+  (2)− [1−  (1− 2)] 0 (2) 
0 (2) = − [1−  (1− 2)] 00 (2)  0
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Therefore, for 1 ≤ ∗2 ≤ ∗, we have (using 0 (∗) =  (∗)):
 (∗2) ≥  (∗) = ∆+  (∗)− [1−  (1− ∗)] 0 (∗) = (1− )∆+ ∗∆  0
and thus:
2
1 (1 
∗
2) ≤ − [1 +  (1− 
∗
2)]
[1− 2 (1− 1) (1− ∗2)]2
 (∗)  0
•  (∗2) ≥  (∗). To see this, it suffices to check that  () decreases with  in the range  ≤ ∗:
0 () =  [1−  (1− )] [−∆+ 
0 ()]−  {(1− )∆+  ()}
[1−  (1− )]2
= −∆+ [1−  (1− )] 
0 ()−  ()
[1−  (1− )]2
=
 ()
[1−  (1− )]2 
• where
 () ≡ −∆+ [1−  (1− )] 0 ()−  () 
 0 () = [1−  (1− )] 00 ()  0
Therefore, for  ≤ ∗ (using 0 (∗) =  (∗)):
0 () ≤  (
∗)
[1−  (1− )]2
=
 {−∆+ [1−  (1− ∗)] 0 (∗)−  (∗)}
[1−  (1− )]2
= − 1−  (1− 
∗)
[1−  (1− )]2∆  0
• But this implies:
0 (∗2) = ∗2   (∗2) ≥  (∗) = 0 (∗) 
contradicting the working assumption ∗2 ≤ ∗.
By contrast, ∗1 can be lower than ∗, and may well be equal to 0 even when ∗ ∗2  0:
Proposition 10 When ∆
1−  0 (0) ≥ 2∆1− , then ∗2  ∗  ∗1 = 0.
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Proof. From the above, ∗2  ∗  0 when ∆1−  0 (0). We then have ∗1 = 0 when:
∆
1−   
0 (0) ≥ 1 (0 ∗2) =  [ (∗2) + ∗2 (1− ∗2)] 
where ∗2 and ∗2 are jointly determined by
0 (∗2) = ∗2 =  [1 +  (1− 
∗
2)]∆+  (∗2)
1− 2 (1− ∗2) 
In particular, this is always the case when:
∆
1−   
0 (0) ≥ 
2∆
1−  
To see this, note that
1 (0 ∗2) = 2 (0 ∗2)− max2 [2 (0 
∗
2) 2 −  (2)] ≤ 2 (0 ∗2)  2 (0 0) = 
2∆
1−  
as 2 (0 2) decreases with 2 in the range 2 ∈ [0 ∗2]:
2 (0 2)
2 = 
[1− 2 (1− 2)] [−∆+ 0 (2)]− 2 {[1 +  (1− 2)]∆+  (2)}
[1− 2 (1− 2)]2
= 2− (1 + )∆+ [1− 
2 (1− 2)] 0 (2)− 2 (2)
[1− 2 (1− 2)]2
=
−2 (2)
[1− 2 (1− 2)]2 
where:
 (2) = (1 + )∆+ 2 (2)− £1− 2 (1− 2)¤ 0 (2) 
0 (2) = −00 (2)  0
Therefore, for 2 ≤ ∗2 (using 0 (∗2) = 2 (0 ∗2)):
2 (0 2)
2 ≤
−2 (∗2)
[1− 2 (1− 2)]2
=
−2 {(1 + )∆+ 2 (∗2)− [1− 2 (1− ∗2)] 0 (∗2)}
[1− 2 (1− 2)]2
= −2 (1 + )∆+ 
2 (∗2)−  {[1 +  (1− ∗2)]∆+  (∗2)}
[1− 2 (1− 2)]2
= − [1− 
2 (1− ∗2)]
[1− 2 (1− 2)]2
2∆  0
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Note finally that, contrary to ∗, ∗2 may well be equal to 1. For instance, if 2∆1− ≤ 0 (0) (so
that ∗1 = 0), this is the case when
0 (1) ≤ 2 (0 1) = ∆+ 2 (1) 
Hence, if  is large enough that
 £0 (1)− 2 (1)¤ ≤ (1− ) 0 (0) 
we have ∗2 = 1  ∗  ∗1 = 0 whenever ∆ is such that 2∆ lies in the range [ (0 (1)− 2 (1)) 
(1− ) 0 (0)].
F.2 Welfare
We now compare welfare in the two scenarios, and draw the implications for optimal contract
duration. As in the case of constant returns to scale, increasing contract duration (from one
period to two periods) fosters investment in the last contracting period, but reduces that in
the first period. For the sake of exposition, we will focus on the case where 0 (0) ≥ 2∆
1− , which
implies ∗1 = 0. As long as 0 (0)  ∆1− , however, ∗2 and ∗ are positive (and in that case
∗2  ∗). The trade-off involved is then exactly the same as with constant returns to scale:
compared with one-period contracting, two-period contracting yields less frequent investment
(as it only occurs in the second period of a contract), but greater intensity (that is, in the second
contracting period there is more investment than with one-period contracts). Intuitively, the
balance will be in favor of one-period contracting when it already yields substantial investment
intensity, and can be in favor of longer contracts otherwise.
• One-period contracting.
Expected welfare is given by (where the superscript 1 refers to one-period contracting):
 1 = Π
 +Π
2
=
 + 
2
−  (
∗)
2
+ Π
 +Π
2
+  
∗
2
¡Π −Π¢ 
where +
2
= +
2
+ ∗
2
∆ and  ¡Π −Π¢ = 0 (∗); hence:
(1− ) 1 = +
2
+
 (∗)
2
 (35)
where
 () ≡ ∆−  () + 0()
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increases with :
0 () = ∆+ 00()  0
• Two-period contracting. As ∗1 = 0, expected welfare is given by:
2 = Π

1 +Π1
2
=
1 + 1
2
−  (
∗
2)
2
+ 2Π

1 +Π1
2
+ 2 
∗
2
2
¡Π1 −Π2 ¢ 
where 

1 +1
2
= (1 + ) +
2
+  ∗2
2
∆ and  ¡Π1 −Π1 ¢ = 0 (∗2); hence:¡
1− 2¢2 = (1 + ) +
2
+

2
 (∗2) 
or:
(1− )2 = +
2
+
 (∗2)
2 (1 + )  (36)
• Comparison. From (35) and (36), welfare is higher under two-period contracting if and
only if:

1 + 
∗(∗2)  ∗(∗)
Note that 
1+ is bounded above by
1
2
. Therefore, if ∗ is large, because ∆ is large or  and 
are close to 1, then one-period contracting will lead to greater welfare. If instead ∗ is small,
then two-period contracting be preferable.33
33For instance, for the quadratic cost function  () =  + 22 considered in footnote 32, two-period con-
tracting generates more welfare than one-period contracting when, e.g.,  = 1,  ' 1,  = 12 (which, for  = 1,
amounts to  = 34), and ∆ ≥ 134 , in which case ∗2 = 1  ∗1 = 0 and (
∗
2)
2 =
15
8   (∗) = 74 .
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